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ACTION

and Kennedy-DeGaulle meeting in Paris, it would be made with intent of obtaining

US-Kennedy-DeGaulle agreement to go ahead with inspection. Once US would and could deliver an irrevocable commitment to remove all offensive weapons systems in Cuba and undergo UN verification satisty U.S. and other GAS countries this in fact done and does not recur.

2. Although four days have now passed since understanding reached and U Thant has made best efforts, all we have so far is verbal assurances by Sov reps in NY and Cuba to US and UN without element of verification which in view history of this affair US regards as essential.

3. US has acted expeditiously and in good faith, promptly accepting Soviet proposal that ICRC act as US agent for inspection incoming vessels. (US believes we should probably wait to put this in effect until after Cuban agreement, but if no actions on this will come later today) also promptly informed Sov rep of our present position that action during period of Havana visit. Also US does aware USN has close surveillance to prevent anti-Castro Cubans from any action which would upset execution of

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Authority

751 Ltr 1/1/72

Agreement

JK/umg NARS Date 1/21/72

Initiated by: WH Johnson/WH: McG. Bundy: JMW 11/1/62

Approved by: G - V. Alford Johnson

Cleared w/ White House: McG. Bundy
The Secretary (in substance)
LOD/Mr. Nitze

S/S - Mr. Brubec

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agreement, e.g. arrest of group with boat in Florida yesterday.

b. On question verification USG has expressed willingness accept wide range of possible US arrangements but there does not yet appear likelihood even any one of these can be implemented.

5. President's responsibility for US security demands that in absence US verification, US undertake whatever steps it can to provide verification. Subordinate to this overriding consideration but nevertheless important is assurance to US and LA public.

6. Thus, although much less satisfactory than US verification on the ground and from the air with cooperation Sovs and Cuba, US must in elemental interests of safety continue aerial surveillance. This surveillance is being carried out in as unprovocative a manner and on as limited a scale as possible by unarmed aircraft. While US accepts that some conventional anti-aircraft guns may be under Cuban control, it cannot accept that sophisticated weapons and control systems, including SAM's, do not require participation of Sov technicians and thus are not or could not be made subject to Soviet control. If US reconnaissance aircraft fired on or destroyed, serious question appropriate means protect US aircraft will arise. We might then face a cycle of action and reaction which would put us back where we were last week. Thus of utmost importance Sovs immediately take measures to assure reconnaissance aircraft not fired on.

7. Second sentence of President's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of October 27
is clear in covering all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use UNCP. This covers not only systems under Soviet control but also those allegedly under Cuban control. The President considers Khrushchev's reply of October 28 as clear.

9. The President particularly desires that there should be
no discussion of wider issues from our side until the offensive weapons in
Asia are clearly on their way home. You must therefore avoid any exploration
of tempting fields like Berlin and disarmament, making it plain that while we
look forward to such discussion later, we cannot get anywhere on anything else
until we have successfully put in operation the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on
the present matter.

RUSK